






Philosophy for Children as Listening
Avoiding Pitfalls of Instrumentalization
Abstract
Since its inception in the seventies, philosophy for children (P4C) curricula have been un-
der attack from various sides. As Maughn Gregory points out in his paper dealing with 
various criticisms, P4C attracted “overlapping and conflicting criticism” from religious 
and social conservatives to educational psychologists, philosophers, and critical theorists 
(Gregory 2011, 199). Conservative criticism of P4C often goes against the grain of phi-
losophy and liberal education in general and can probably be seen as an age-old dispute 
constantly resurfacing against the effort of philosophers, while psychologists’ arguments 
that philosophical thinking is beyond children of certain age are today easily refuted by 
the work of Kieran Egan (2002) and Alison Gopnik (2009). Critical theorists’ critique, 
however, seems to go deeper than all other criticisms by raising intellectually pertinent 
problem of philosophy education: that instead of fulfilling its promise of liberating subjects 
it in fact interpellates them into free market ideology. As Gert Biesta (2011) tries to show, 
P4C curricula “are supposed to develop a range of skills, including cognitive and thinking 
skills, moral and social skills, and democratic skills” (Ibid. 310) and thereby instrumental-
ize philosophy in order to achieve a certain goal, a dubious and alarming undertaking that 
“can be characterized as ideological” (Ibid. 309). In order for P4C to tackle this problem 
of instrumentalization of philosophy (raised also in Vansieleghem (2005)) the present paper 
suggests that P4C curricula should be seen (and in certain cases reformed) as promoting 
a Socratic dialogue with children, whereby the emphasis lies on listening to a child and 
giving her a voice, and not on “teaching skills”. This paper thus argues that it is precisely 
through philosophical dialogue that a child can be heard as a child, since such a dialogue 
intrinsically presupposes recognition of the conversational partner as an equal interlocutor. 
P4C curricula can thus be regarded as an important part of emerging field of “Pedagogy 







as	“P4C”),	one	should	not	focus	so	much	on	what it can achieve,	that	is	what	
kinds	of	skills	it	helps	developing	in	children	(for	instance	“critical	thinking”,	
“social	responsibility”,	“reading	skills”,	etc.),	but	on	why is it right to give 

































II. P4C and its critiques
Since	its	beginnings,	the	aim	of	P4C	was	viewed	predominantly	in	terms	of	
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consider	 two	other	critiques	of	 the	 idea	of	P4C.	The	first	one	 is	connected	
with	conservativist,	and	the	second	with	developmental	psychologists.
Perhaps	the	most	ideological	of	all	objections	against	P4C	is	the	one	brought	
forth	by	conservative	critics	who	are	 convinced	 that	philosophy	may	 spoil	
their	children’s	minds	in	roughly	the	same	way	Socrates	was	accused	of	cor-
rupting	the	youth.	We	can	even	find	some	parents	that	are	prepared	to	say	to	
P4C	practitioners	 that	 “No	one	 should	 talk	 to	my	children	about	 right	 and	















































T.	 Grušovnik,	 L.	 Hercog,	 Philosophy	 for	
Children	as	Listening310





























this	problem.	We	are	only	briefly	examining	 three	of	 them:	 in	a	paper	 that	
interestingly	argues	for	“exposure”	as	a	“guiding	educational	concept”,	Gert	
Biesta	tries	to	show	that	“the	educational	engagement	with	philosophy	tends	
to	 model	 itself	 on	 a	 rational-epistemological	 interpretation	 of	 the	 commu-
nity	of	scientific	enquiry”,	which	is	“visible	in	its	focus	on	the	development	







Nancy	 Vansieleghem	 expresses	 similar	 concerns	 by	 explaining	 “that	 phi-
losophy	 for	 children	 is	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 critical	 thinking	 and	
dialogue	are	the	necessary	conditions	for	the	transformation	of	children	into	
democratic,	free	citizens	who	can	think	for	themselves”	(Vansieleghem	2005,	










































and	procedural	norms	he	advocates	did not serve us well in the past, and that 
















ideology	it	wants	 to	combat	–	 just	 like	“critical	 thinking”).	 If	 the	debate	 is	
reformulated	in	such	a	way	that	people	–	in	our	case	children	–	have	a right 














be	seen	as	teaching and	more	as	conversing.	Not	talking to them	but	talking 
with them.	Or,	as	Vansieleghem	puts	it:
“After	 all,	 does	 not	 the	 community	 of	 inquiry	 always	 imply	 thinking	with the	 other,	 facing	
conflict	 with the	 other,	 searching	 for	 an	 answer	with the	 other,	 doubting	with the	 other…?”	
(Vansieleghem	2005,	33)
III. The right to participate in philosophical conversation – 
     the right to be heard
However,	if	one	changes	the	P4C	debate	from	“aims	debate”	into	“rights	dis-























decide	whether	 to	participate	 in	 it	or	not.	We	should	start	 listening	to	 indi-
vidual	children	without	expecting	anything	in	return.	This,	at	last,	is	also	what	
the	article	12	of	the	Convention on the Rights of the Child obliges	us	to	do,	
and	it	would	also	be	in	line	with	the	emerging	field	of	“Pedagogy	of	Listen-
ing”	(cf.	Rinaldi	2001).
On	 the	other	hand,	 exposing	children	 to	philosophy	also	materializes	 their	
right	 to	be	acquainted	with	different forms of discourse, and different pos-
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Nevertheless,	 one	 issue	 still	 remains	 for	 P4C	 if	 its	 understanding	 is	 trans-
formed	 through	 the	“rights	debate”:	 if	 its	main	goal	 should	be	 listening to 
what children have to say,	 then	 this	may	not be enough to	construe	a	P4C	

















































memories	as	constant	 inspiration,	or	 sometimes	as	a	bitter	 reminder.	Next,	
we	believe,	there	are	some	guidelines	for	the	material	(for	instance	stories)	
to	be	chosen	for	a	P4C	practice:	 the	corresponding	author’s	own	advice	 to	
students	 in	 the	classroom	is	 that	 they	should	only	choose	those	stories	 that	
feature	 ambiguous	characters	 and	 situations;	 they	are	 asked	 to	pick	 stories	






















should	 be	 presented	 to	 educational	 policy	makers.	 Slovenian	 national	 pro-




anteeing	 the	 possibility	 of	 verbalization	 and	 other	manners	 of	 expression”	
(Curriculum	 1999,	 9)	 for	 children	 as	 a	 guideline	 that	 should	 contribute	 to	
the	realization	of	the	Curriculum’s	main	goals.	P4C	as	presented	here	could	
thus	be	seen	as	one	of	the	most	important	practices	that	can	make	possible	

























philosophical	 arguments	 against	 it	will	 be	 rejected	ab initio.	However,	 by	
shifting	the	debate	from	“aims”	to	“rights”	practitioners	could	say	that,	again,	
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Filozofija za djecu kao slušanje
Izbjegavanje zamki instrumentalizacije
Sažetak
Od zasnivanja u 70­im godinama 20. stoljeća, kurikulum filozofije za djecu bio je napadnut s 
raznih strana. Kao što Maughn Gregory ističe u njegovom članku o tim kritikama , filozofija za 
djecu privukla je »preklapajuće i proturječne kritike« od religijskih i društvenih konzervativaca 
do edukacijskih psihologa, filozofa i kritičkih teoretičara (Gregory 2011, 199). Konzervativna 
kritika filozofije za djecu često ide protiv struje filozofije i liberalnog obrazovanja općenito te 
se može promatrati kao stari spor koji se konstantno pojavljuje unatoč naporu filozofa, dok se 
argumenti psihologa da filozofijsko mišljenje nije moguće kod djece određene dobi danas lako 
pobijaju istraživanjima Kierana Egana (2002) i Alison Gopnik (2009). S druge strane, čini se 
da kritika kritičkih teoretičara seže dublje nego druge jer razmatra intelektualno relevantan 
problem filozofskog obrazovanja: umjesto da ispuni svoje obećanje da će osloboditi subjekte, 
ustvari ih interpelira u ideologiju slobodnog tržišta. Kao što Gert Biesta nastoji pokazati, kuri-
kuli filozofije za djecu »trebaju razviti spektar vještina, uključujući kognitivne vještine i vještine 
mišljenja, moralne i društvene vještine te demokratske vještine« (Biesta 2011, 310) te na taj 
način instrumentaliziraju filozofiju da bi postigli određeni cilj, što je dvojben i alarmantan 
pothvat koji se »može okarakterizirati kao ideološki« (ibid., 309). Da bi se uhvatilo u koštac s 
problemom instrumentalizacije filozofije (o čemu raspravlja i Vansieleghem (2005)), ovaj rad 
sugerira da kurikuli filozofije za djecu trebaju promovirati sokratski dijalog s djecom (te u 
nekim slučajevima biti reformirani u tom smjeru), gdje se naglasak stavlja na slušanje djeteta 
te davanje	glasa, a ne na »nastavne vještine«. Ovaj rad stoga tvrdi da upravo kroz filozofski dija-
log dijete može biti saslušano kao dijete, jer takav dijalog intrinzično pretpostavlja prepozna-
vanje partnera u razgovoru kao ravnopravnog sugovornika. Tako se kurikuli filozofije za djecu 




Philosophie für Kinder als Zuhören
Vermeidung von Fallstricken der Instrumentalisierung
Zusammenfassung
Seit ihrer Einführung in den Siebzigerjahren waren die Curricula der Philosophie für Kinder 
(PfK) von verschiedenen Seiten her den Angriffen ausgesetzt. Wie Maughn Gregory in seinem 
Artikel über die unterschiedlichen Kritiken darauf hinweist, zog die PfK „eine sich überlap-
pende und widersprüchliche Kritik“ auf sich, von Religions- und Sozialkonservativen bis zu 
pädagogischen Psychologen, Philosophen und kritischen Theoretikern (Gregory 2011, 199). 
Die konservative Kritik an der PfK schwimmt oftmals gegen den Strom der Philosophie und der 
liberalen Erziehung im Allgemeinen und kann vermutlich als ein uralter Disput angesehen wer-
den, der trotz der Bemühungen der Philosophen andauernd auftaucht, während die Argumente 
der Psychologen, das philosophische Denken sei für Kinder im bestimmten Alter unbegreiflich, 
heutzutage leicht durch das Werk von Kieran Egan (2002) und Alison Gopnik (2009) wider-
legt werden. Die Kritik der kritischen Theoretiker scheint andererseits tiefer zu reichen als alle 
anderen Kritiken, indem sie ein intellektuell relevantes Problem der Philosophieerziehung an-
schneidet: dass sie, statt ihr Versprechen der Befreiung der Subjekte einzuhalten, sie in der Tat 
in die Ideologie des freien Markts einfügt. Wie Gert Biesta (2011) zu zeigen versucht, „sollen“ 
die Curricula der PfK „eine Reihe von Fertigkeiten entwickeln, einschließlich der kognitiven 
und Denkfertigkeiten, der moralischen und sozialen Fertigkeiten sowie der demokratischen 
Fertigkeiten“ (ebd., 310), und instrumentalisieren dadurch die Philosophie, um ein bestimmtes 
Ziel zu erreichen, was ein fragwürdiges und alarmierendes Unternehmen ist, das „sich als ide-
ologisch charakterisieren lässt“ (ebd., 309). Damit die PfK dieses Problem der Instrumentali-
sierung der Philosophie in Angriff nimmt (erörtert auch von Vansieleghem (2005)), schlägt der 
vorliegende Artikel vor, die Curricula der PfK (in bestimmten Fällen in dieser Richtung refor-
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miert) sollten den sokratischen Dialog mit Kindern fördern, wobei der Schwerpunkt darin liege, 
dem Kind zuzuhören und die Stimme	zu	geben, und nicht in den „Lehrfertigkeiten“. Aufgrund 
dessen argumentiert diese Arbeit, gerade durch den philosophischen Dialog könne ein Kind als 
Kind gehört werden, da ein solcher Dialog intrinsisch die Anerkennung des Gesprächspartners 
als eines gleichberechtigten Gesprächsteilnehmers voraussetze. Die Curricula der PfK können 
demnach als ein wichtiger Teil des aufstrebenden Felds der „Pädagogik des Zuhörens“ be-





Une philosophie pour les enfants en tant qu’« écoute »
Éviter les pièges de l’instrumentalisation
Résumé
Depuis sa création dans les années 70, le programme éducatif de philosophie a été attaqué de 
divers côtés. Comme le souligne Maughn Gregory dans son article consacré à ces critiques, 
la philosophie pour les enfants a attiré des « critiques qui s’imbriquent et se contredisent », 
partant des conservateurs religieux et sociaux et allant jusqu’aux psychologues de l’éduca-
tion, philosophes et théoriciens critiques (Gregory 2011, 199). La critique conservatrice de la 
philosophie pour les enfants va souvent à l’encontre du courant de la philosophie et de l’édu-
cation libérale en général et peut être vue comme un vieux conflit qui réapparait constamment 
malgré l’effort des philosophes, bien que les arguments du psychologue, selon lesquelles une 
pensée philosophique chez les enfants d’un certain âge n’est pas possible, aient été facilement 
réfutés par les recherches de Kieran Egan (2002) et Alison Gopnik (2009). Toutefois, il sem-
blerait que la critique des théoriciens critiques va plus loin que les autres car elle met en avant 
un problème intellectuellement pertinent pour l’éducation philosophique : au lieu de tenir sa 
promesse en vue de la libération des sujets, elle interpelle à vrai dire ces mêmes sujets au sein 
d’une idéologie de marché libre. À la manière dont Gert Berta tente de le montrer, les pro-
grammes éducatifs de philosophie pour les enfants «sont supposés mettre en œuvre un éventail 
de compétences, comportant des compétences cognitives et des compétences de la pensée, des 
compétences morales et sociales, et des compétences démocratiques » (Biesta 2011, 310). Ainsi, 
ces programmes instrumentalisent la philosophie pour arriver à leurs fins, entreprise douteuse 
et alarmante « qui peut être caractérisée d’idéologique » (Ibid, 309). Afin de s’attaquer au 
coeur du problème de l’instrumentalisation de la philosophie (problème également abordé par 
Vansieleghem (2005)), ce travail suggère que les programmes de philosophie pour les enfants 
promeuvent les dialogues socratiques avec les enfants (et, dans certains cas, soient réformés 
en vue de cette voie), dialogues où l’accent est mis sur l’écoute de l’enfant et sur le fait de lui 
donner	la	parole, et non sur les « compétences de l’enseignement ». Par là, ce travail stipule 
que c’est précisément à travers un dialogue philosophique que l’enfant peut être entendu en 
tant qu’enfant car un dialogue de la sorte suppose de manière intrinsèque la reconnaissance 
du partenaire dans la conversation comme interlocuteur égal. Ainsi, les programmes éducatifs 
peuvent être perçus comme une partie importante du domaine émergeant de « la pédagogie de 
l’écoute » (v. Rinaldi 2001).
Mots-clés
philosophie	pour	les	enfants,	critique,	instrumentalisation,	idéologie,	dialogue	socratique,	pédagogie	
de	l’écoute
